



**Director of
Central
Intelligence**

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Assessed Manpower of Warsaw Pact Forces in the NATO Guidelines Area, 1983

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum

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**ASSESSED MANPOWER OF
WARSAW PACT FORCES IN THE
NATO GUIDELINES AREA, 1983**

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PREFACE

This Interagency Intelligence Memorandum assesses Warsaw Pact ground and air force manpower in Central Europe (East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia). It was produced in support of the US effort to negotiate a mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR) agreement and to establish the US position on the size of the Pact forces in the reduction area. The figures in the Memorandum represent the estimated numerical strength, as of 1 January 1983, of all Warsaw Pact personnel that the United States currently defines as military servicemen subject to MBFR negotiation: that is, "all active-duty uniformed military servicemen, except naval personnel, in the area of reduction." The rounded figures depict the US estimate of the number of military personnel assigned to the rosters of Pact units in Central Europe at the beginning of 1983 and are not intended to represent the number of personnel authorized or available for duty on one particular day. In a Statement of Estimative Confidence, the uncertainty associated with these point estimates has been quantified.

This Memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces. It was drafted by [] the Central Intelligence Agency and [] [] the Defense Intelligence Agency and was coordinated with the intelligence components of the Departments of State and Defense and with the Central Intelligence Agency.

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DEFINITION OF ROUNDING RULES

With the exception of maneuver division assessments, all printed line item figures, subtotals, and totals in this Memorandum have been subjected to the following rounding rules:

<u>Estimated figures in range</u>	<u>Rounded to nearest</u>
1 through 49	5
50 through 249	25
250 through 999	50
1,000 through 4,999	100
5,000 through 9,999	250
10,000 and greater	500

Although printed subtotals are rounded, totals have been derived from nonrounded subtotals (not shown).

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SUMMARY OF CHANGES SINCE THE 1982 ASSESSMENT

This Memorandum presents our estimate of Warsaw Pact manpower in the NATO Guidelines Area (NGA) as of 1 January 1983. A comparison of this assessment with our previous one for 1 January 1982 shows a net increase of 14,500 servicemen. The figures indicate an increase of about 11,000 in the estimate for Pact ground forces and over 3,000 in that for Pact air and air defense forces. Significant changes in the figures since 1982 are summarized as follows.

Soviet Forces: Previous years' assessments¹ of Soviet divisions in the NGA maintained, although acknowledging considerable uncertainty, that divisional assigned strengths probably were increasing in proportion to the structural expansion associated with divisional reorganization. Evidence available since January 1982 indicated, however, that at least for part of the expansion, this was not the case. The implications of this evidence, coupled with the detection of some structural contraction,² resulted in an assessment of Soviet divisional strengths for 1983 that was 11,800 less than last year's assessment. This represented a decrease of 8,500 for the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG), 1,000 for the Northern Group of Forces (NGF) and 2,300 for the Central Group of Forces (CGF). The GSFG revision included the personnel reduction resulting from the conversion of a motorized rifle division to a tank division.

Analysis of manning data and organization and equipment modification resulted in a reduction in our assessment of from 100 to 700 personnel per division from the 1982 assessment. In terms of assigned strength as a percentage of war authorizations, our assessment of motorized rifle and tank divisions is 85 and 90 percent, respectively.

The decrease in divisional manning estimates was partially offset by a reassessment of the Other Rear Service category. In the 1982 assessment Komendatury were included under this category. In this assessment Komendatury were considered separately, and troops assigned to post exchanges, commissaries, officer clubs, garrison services, and sports and band organizations were added to Other Rear Services. This resulted in a net increase of approximately 9,100 in Komendatury and Other Rear Services.

² Motorized rifle regiments of reorganized tank divisions were identified as having two rather than three motorized rifle battalions.

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Other nondivisional structural and organizational changes with manpower implications included the identification and assessment of training area units subordinate to GOFs and armies (+2,500), the addition of motorized rifle battalions to three independent tank regiments (+1,000), the identification of additional depot units (+1,000), the addition of three new air assault battalions in GSFG (+900), the increase in the assessment of the nuclear-capable army-level artillery brigades (+600), and the conversion of a signal regiment to a brigade in CGF (+600). New information and reassessments account for a variety of additional incremental increases and decreases in individual line items.

Non-Soviet Forces. In non-Soviet forces, incremental changes in individual line items accounted for most of the change in our assessment. In East Germany, reassessment of Bezirk/Kreis Staffs (+3,000) and NCO schools (+500) and the identification of two additional construction units (+1,650) account for the bulk of the increase. In Poland, a reassessment of schools (+2,000) and the number of trainees in the 1st Mechanized Division (+1,200) account for the change in our estimate of Polish Ground Forces. In Czechoslovakia a reassessment of schools resulted in a lower student total (-1,500). Increases in non-Soviet air and air defense forces mainly were attributable to the identification of additional radar units.

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STATUS OF SOVIET FORCES MANPOWER

The 1982 estimate described a reduction in estimative confidence resulting from the continued reorganization and some not yet fully evaluated evidence of compensatory actions. Evaluation of this and specific manning data has demonstrated that at least some elements of the reorganization were achieved without an accompanying increase in peacetime manning. This data also included some direct evidence indicating increased differences between peacetime and wartime personnel authorizations in some subunits, and some additional evidence identifying previously undetected structural contraction. The generalization of this and unit-specific evidence of certain divisional subunit strengths resulted in lower assessments of division strengths.

This year's assessment pointed up the contrast between direct manpower evidence and evidence of structural change. While we must continue to rely on evidence of structural change as our first indication of potential manpower change, the direct manpower evidence suggests caution in assuming too rigid a link between the two. Moreover, our assessments of some categories of units, such as training units and rear service organizations, carry the danger of recounting personnel counted elsewhere, or of including some civilian personnel. The net effect of these considerations is an increase in uncertainty associated with our current estimates of Soviet forces in the NGA.

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Table I
SUMMARY

**A. WARSAW PACT MANPOWER IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA,
DIVIDED BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORCES**

(All East European national air defense personnel are counted as air manpower, and all Pact helicopter personnel in units assigned to or supporting ground forces are counted as ground manpower.)

	<u>Ground</u>	<u>(Divisions)</u>	<u>Air</u>	<u>Total</u>
Soviet	487,500	(280,500)	58,500	545,000 ^a
East Germany	123,500	(61,500)	38,500	162,000
Poland	234,000	(99,000)	92,500	326,000 ^a
Czechoslovakia	147,000	(66,000)	57,000	204,500 ^a
Total Warsaw Pact	992,000	(506,500) ^b	246,000 ^b	1,238,500 ^b

**B. CHANGES IN THE US ESTIMATE OF NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF
WARSAW PACT MANPOWER IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA**

(This table presents the numerical differences between this estimate and the CIA/DIA estimate compiled in 1982—see IIM 83-10001.) ^c

	<u>Ground</u>	<u>Air</u>	<u>Total</u>
Soviet	+3,000	+1,000	+3,500 ^a
East Germany	+6,500	+1,000	+7,500
Poland	+3,000	+1,000	+3,500 ^a
Czechoslovakia	-1,500	+500	0 ^a
Total Warsaw Pact	+11,000	+3,000 ^b	+14,500 ^a

^a Because of rounding rules, totals do not add across.

^b Because of rounding rules, totals do not add down.

^c See page 2, "Summary of Changes Since the 1982 Assessment," for an explanation of the major changes.

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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAA—antiaircraft artillery	Maint—maintenance
Acft—aircraft	MBFR—mutual and balanced force reduction
Acq—acquisition	MD—military district
AD—air defense	Med—medical
Admin—administrative	Misc—miscellaneous
AF—air force	MND—Ministry of National Defense
Afld—airfield	MP—military police
Ammo—ammunition	Msl—missile
Arty—artillery	
	NATO—North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Bde—brigade	NCO—noncommissioned officer
Bmb—bomber	NGA—NATO Guidelines Area
Bn—battalion	NGF—Northern Group of Forces
	No.—northern
CGF—Central Group of Forces	
Chem—chemical	Off—Officer
Cmd—command	
Co—company	POL—petrol (gasoline), oil, and lubricants
COMINT—communications intelligence	PRTB—mobile technical repair base
Comms—communications	(from the Russian <i>podvizhnaya remontnaya tekhnicheskaya baza</i>)
Const—construction	
	QM—quartermaster
Def—defense	
Det—detachment	Recce—reconnaissance
Div—division	R&D—research and development
	Rgt—regiment
ECM—electronic countermeasures	RR—railroad
Engr—engineer	
	SA—shock army
Ftr—fighter	SAA—strategic air army
	SAM—surface-to-air missile
G—guards	Sig—signals
GA—guards army	SIGINT—signals intelligence
GCI—ground-controlled intercept	Spt—support
Gnd—ground	Sqdn—squadron
GSFG—Group of Soviet Forces, Germany	SSM—surface-to-surface missile
GTA—guards tank army	
	Tac—tactical
Hel—helicopter	TAF—tactical air force
Hq—headquarters	Tech—technical
	Tgt—target
Ind—independent	Tng—training
Insp—inspector	Trans—transport, transportation
Intel—intelligence	
	VGK—Supreme High Command (from the Russian <i>Verkhovnoye Glavnokomandovaniye</i>)

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APPENDIX: ORDER-OF-BATTLE MAPS

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